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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to suggest the adoption of a fully informed approach in the analysis of CAP 
expenditure. The debate on CAP expenditure is generally based on ex-ante images of the budget as presented 
in the Multiannual Financial Framework and, before each financial year, on the budget appropriations for 
commitments. But this differs significantly from the actual payments as recorded ex-post in the Financial 
Reports.  These  differences  are  mainly  concentrated  on  structural  policies  (such  as  regional  and  rural 
development policy), while they do not exist, or are minimal, in the mere transfer policies (such as in Pillar 1 
of the CAP). Based as it is on a partial and distorted image of the expenditure, the analysis and discussion 
on the CAP reform is distorted as well. 
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En fait, tout fonctionne comme si le fait d’avoir conçu des mesures d’intervention à 
partir  de  relations  théoriques  de  causalité  était  considéré  comme  suffisant  pour 
garantir  l’effet  de  ces  mesures.  Ces  constats  et  les  débats  qui  les  accompagnent 
invitent  au  renouvellement  des  approches  de  l’évaluation  pour  évaluer  l’impact 
effectif de l’intervention publique indépendamment des schémas de causalité qui la 
sous-tendent.  
Laurent C., Baudry J., et al (2009),  Pourquoi s’intéresser à la notion d’«evidence-
based policy»?, Revue Tiers Monde , n° 200 - Oct-Déc 2009. Published in Italian with 
the  title:  Perchè  interessarsi  alla  nozione  di  «evidence-based  policy»?, 
Agriregionieuropa, n.23, Dec. 2010, www.agriregionieuropa.it.  
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Daniel Perraud 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
The objective of this work is to contribute to the analysis of agricultural policies and in particular of 
the CAP, through expenditure.  
It  is  an  exercise  that  is  central  to  economic  policy  analysis  since  the  majority  of  policies  are 
implemented  through  the  expenditure.  And  the  analysis  of  the  expenditure,  actually,  provides  a  great 
opportunity for researchers and policy evaluators at all stages of the evaluation process: ex-ante, in itinere 
and ex-post. The opportunity stems from the fact that the expenditure is expressed in monetary units. Thus 
the analysis and comparison can take place on a quantitative basis. This allows the calculation of very simple 
indicators (i.e. percentages, index numbers, unitary values of expenditure per beneficiary, per hectare, etc.). 
Graphical as well as map representations are very easy to draw, understand and interpret by non-experts too.  
These benefits, however, are exposed to several risks. To avoid them it is particularly recommended to 
adopt an “evidence based” approach to evaluation.  
These risks are the following:  1. The risk of forgetting that, in evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of a policy, the expenditure 
is an instrument used to pursue the objective and is not an objective in itself (as is often misunderstood). In 
its role, the expenditure is to be classified as an input and not an output, and still less as an outcome. It is 
therefore not a numerator but a denominator in the calculation of any policy performance indicator. The risk 
here mentioned increases if, as often happens, the reason for spending public funds is sacrificed on the altar 
of speed, i.e. the quality of expenditure to its quantity. All this happens especially when the policy makers 
and the public administrators are pressed by the urgency to spend all available funds by their deadlines (e.g. 
because of the n+2 principle) for the de-commitment. This condition leads frequently to prefer easy and non 
selective  policies  to  more  targeted  and  tailored  ones.  For  their  discriminatory  nature  and  fine  tuned 
definition, the latter are inevitably more complex to implement and manage.  
2. Another risk is to neglect the often profound differences, both quantitative and temporal, between 
expenditure allocation and actual payments, and therefore the actual impact on the reality to which the 
relative  funds  are  addressed.  For  obvious  reasons,  the  attention  is  attracted  more  by  future  spending 
(presently the debate is on the post-2013 Multiannual Financial Framework), than by the past or present 
payments and achievements. But this means that the attention is focused more on the promises that on the 
real results and that not sufficient attention is paid to the evolutionary process that make the latter diverge 
from the former. The result is that the research conclusions, as well as political debate, are systematically 
distorted as far as they are based on indicators, proportions between a policy and another, distribution of 
funds at both territorial and sectoral levels, completely different from reality.  
3.  A  third  risk  is  to  assume  that  any  policy  mobilizes  its  resources,  develops  its  implementative 
channels, and pursues directly and exclusively its objectives independently of all other policies offered at the 
same  time.  This  brings  about  an  underevaluation  of  the  interplay  between  policies  and  their  combined 
effects, as well as the coherence or incoherence between policies with respect to the same objectives. This 
aspect is relevant not only when a policy is implemented, it is also crucial when a policy is designed and 
financed. The policy choices, in fact, are often taken by offsetting the interests and the convenience of each 
participant in dealing with those of any other. This is especially true when, as in the EU, more Member 
States with diverse objectives need to converge under the pressure of a diversified range of lobbies. It is 
therefore very important to put any policy in the context of the actual interests and expectations of each of 
the multiple actors in the real policy game. 
4. Last but not least, while the debate on the cost of a policy usually concentrates on the direct 
expenditure  associated  to  it,  insufficient  attention  is  paid  to  indirect  costs  which  are  connected.  These 
indirect costs are both public and private, and are required to allow the access to the policy of potential 
beneficiaries, to select the most deserving of them, to ensure that the policy is targeted to its objectives, and 
tailored, in such a way as to limit its cost to the necessary minimum. Evaluating the policies only for the 
amount  of  money  directly  committed  and  paid,  risks  missing  a  recognition  of  the  extension  of    the 
overcompensation and the waste of funds paid for compensating costs never incurred. The risk is that, 
neglecting these issues, and under the pressure for simplification and a reduction in administrative costs, the 
objectives of efficiency and effectiveness are under-evaluated, as well as, that of minimizing the deadweight 
effects. 
With this background, the second paragraph presents what can be considered the ex-ante image of the 
CAP expenditure in Europe. The principal data taken from two fundamental documents are reported here: 
the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the Budget drawn before the beginning of each Financial 
year. This image of the CAP expenditure is generally adopted in the political debate on the present and future 
of the policy. The third paragraph is dedicated to a presentation of the ex-post image of the CAP expenditure 
which appears to be quite different from the previous one. This evidence suggests that the current debate on the CAP is based on (at least partially) wrong assumptions. A short insight into the Italian case, presented in 
paragraph 4, suggests further investigation at a more detailed level. The last paragraph presents some final 
remarks on the necessity to integrate the two images of the CAP expenditure and suggests concentrating 
more effort on policy evaluation and monitoring. 
2.  THE CAP AND THE BUDGET: THE EX-ANTE IMAGE 
The table showing the MFF for the current programming period (2007-2013) is the image of EU 
spending for agricultural policy more generally known and routinely quoted in the current debate on the 
CAP. The one shown here in table 1 is the updated version to the current prices of 2009.  
 
Table 1 - Multiannual financial framework at current prices (2009) 
Appropriations for commitments 
Financial years 
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
Total 
2007-13 
1. Sustainable growth  53979  57653  59700  61782  63638  66628  69621  433001 
Competitiveness for growth and employment  8918  10386  11272  12388  12987  14203  15433  85587 
Cohesion for growth and employment  45061  47267  48428  49394  50651  52425  54188  347414 
2. Preservation and management of natural 
resources  55143  59193  59639  60113  60338  60810  61289  416525 
Market related expenditure and direct payments  45759  46217  46679  47146  47617  48093  48574  330085 
3. Citizenship, freedom, security and justice  1273  1362  1523  1693  1889  2105  2376  12221 
Freedom, security and justice  637  747  872  1025  1206  1406  1661  7554 
Citizenship  636  615  651  668  683  699  715  4667 
4. EU as a global player  6578  7002  7440  7893  8430  8997  9595  55935 
5. Administration  7039  7380  7699  8008  8334  8670  9095  56225 
6. Compensation  445  207  210  862 
Total  124457  132797  136211  139489  142629  147210  151976  974769 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/publications/budget_in_fig/syntchif_2009_en.pdf  
  
Heading 2 "Preservation and management of natural resources" is where the CAP is included (together 
with fishery policy, Life+, and some other minor environmental policies). As noted in figure 1 it weighs a 
total of 43.8 per cent of the total budget (42.7 per cent throughout the period of seven years). On the basis of 
decisions already taken, the weight of the headline where the CAP is included is likely to decline over time 
up to 40.2 percent at the end of the period, in 2013. The image of the “cake”, in which the weight of the 
heading where the CAP is contained stands at 43 per cent, is widely represented in the current debate on the 
future of agricultural policy in Europe. It is considered a given. To be picky, in the calculation of the 
percentage one should subtract the Administration costs from the total , which would increase the weight of 
the heading to 46,4 percent. 
 Figure 1 - Breakdown of the EU budget under expenditure headings 
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/publications/budget_in_fig/syntchif_2009_en.pdf  
  
Referring  to  the  budget,  many  politicians,  lobbyists  and  researchers  develop  their  own  analyses, 
recommendations and proposals on the CAP reform taking this as a common reference. Others take as a 
reference the annual budgets. In Table 2 the annual budget for the 2008 and 2009 financial years is reported). 
There are two items listed: Appropriations for Commitments (the legal obligations authorized in the financial 
year) and Appropriations for Payments (the authorized payments for commitments entered into during the 
current or previous financial years). Looking at the Appropriations for Commitments for the year 2009, the 
incidence  of  the  CAP  on  the  EU  budget  was  a  total  of  40.7  percent  (split  into  30.5  and  10.2  percent 
respectively between Pillar 1 and 2). A similar figure, 41.3 percent (31.1 and 10.2 per cent between Pillar 1 
and 2) was recorded in 2008. 
 
Table 2 – The EU budget by financial framework headings (billion euro) 
 
Budget 2008  Budget 2009 
Appr Comm  Appr Pay  Appr Comm   Appr Pay 
CAP 1st Pillar  40.562  40.568  40.781  40.781 
CAP 2nd Pillar  13.303  11.383  13.652  10.229 
CAP total  53.865  51.951  54.433  51.010 
Other Preserv & mngmt natural res  1.694  1.266  1.689  1.556 
Sustainable growth  58.338  45.732  60.196  46.000 
Citizenship freedom etc.  1.635  1.489  1.515  1.296 
EU global payer  7.551  7.847  8.104  8.324 
Administration  7.279  7.280  7.701  7.701 
Total  130.363  115.565  133.637  115.887 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/publications/budget_in_fig/syntchif_2009_en.pdf 
 
The site of DG AGRI, for example, in its pages discussing the theme: "The Common Agricultural 
Policy after 2013" refers exactly to the above data where, in the "CAP post-2013: key graphs and figures" the 
first graph is that reproduced in figure 2. Looking at the solid line, the incidence of CAP expenditure on the 
overall  EU  budget in the financial  years  2008  and 2009,  approximately  corresponds  to  the  percentages 
mentioned: the CAP lies just above 40 percent.  Figure 2 - CAP expenditure in the total EU expenditure according to the DG AGRI web site 
(2007 constant prices) 
 




In short, in the current debate on the present and future of the CAP, an assumption generally accepted 
on the weight of this policy on the overall budget is that its incidence lies just above 40 per cent, and that the 
ratio between Pillar 1 and 2 is more or less 3:1. Is this a legitimate assumption? Does the evidence of the 
amount of money received by its recipients endorse this postulate? 
The  comparison  in  the  budget  between  Appropriations  for  Commitments  and  Appropriations  for 
Payments suggests caution or at least some additional considerations. In fact, the weight of the total CAP 
expenditure on the overall EU budget, in terms of Appropriations for Payments (figure 3) rises significantly: 
44.0 percent in 2009, and 45.0 percent in 2008.  
 
Figure 3 – Appropriations for Payments 2009 
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/publications/budget_in_fig/syntchif_2009_en.pdf  
  
This is the result of a surge of about 5 points (from 30.5 to 35.2 per cent) of the relative weight of 
pillar 1 and a decrease of pillar 2 (from 10.2 to 8,8 per cent). The ratio between Pillar 1 and 2 drops, 
consequently, from 3:1 to 4:1. The reason is obvious. It regards the nature of the CAP in relation to other EU policies and, within the CAP, the different nature between Pillar 1 and 2. Pillar 1 contains, in fact, essentially 
transfer measures based on status (personal) attributes of the beneficiary. The amount of money is pre-
defined once and for all, it is automatically paid by the Paying Agencies and reimbursed soon after by the 
EU.  The  Single  Farm  Payment  in  particular,  which represents 74  percent  of  the  total  amount  of funds 
directed to Pillar 1, has these characteristics. 
On the other hand, the spending process under Pillar 2 of the CAP, as well as under several other 
major EU policies (e.g. regional policy or research policy), have a multi-annual nature, as projects and 
programs require time for execution and, even before the execution, from an administrative standpoint, the 
following steps (design, definition and emission of tenders, collection of applications, applications appraisal, 
selection, approval of the ranking, commitment, etc.) take time. In Table 2, in fact, the heading "Sustainable 
growth", which typically includes the regional policy for research, presents the maximum deviation between 
Appropriations  for  Commitments  and  Appropriations  for  Payments  (the  latter  are  lower  than  the  first, 
respectively, by 23.6 percent in 2009 and 21.6 percent in 2008). This means that sometimes the payment 
could not follow the commitment and the funds be disengaged and return available for other uses, and also 
that the payments, when they occur, are made in depreciated money, as budgeted in nominal values of the 
financial year when the commitment was signed.. 
3.  THE CAP AND THE BUDGET: THE EX-POST IMAGE  
The total volume of CAP expenditure and its distribution between Pillar 1 and 2 show therefore 
significant differences in terms of Appropriations moving from the MFF to the annual budgets and, in the 
latter, shifting from the appropriations for Commitments to those for Payments. But a more striking picture 
of CAP expenditure emerges from the Financial Reports (France) which report the payments actually paid 
during the financial year. 
Table 3 shows the results of the annual payments reported for the financial year 2009. For the reasons 
mentioned above, the CAP expenditure is here compared with the total expenditure, net of the administrative 
costs (which in payments are equivalent to 6.4 percent of the EU total). The weight of the CAP appears to be 
much higher than that registered so far. Of the 110.7 billion euro of net total payments, 54.8 billion euro is 
paid for the CAP which rises to the level of 49.5 per cent (41.6 per cent due to Pillar 1 and 7.9 per cent to 
Pillar 2). The ratio between the two pillars in terms of payments, therefore, falls to around 5:1.  
Table 3 – The CAP payments in the Financial Report – Financial year 2009 
 
a)  Absolute values  
Pillar1   Pillar 2  Total CAP 
Net Total UE 
Expenditure   (- 
Admin) 
M€  M€  M€  M€ 
 EU-15   36563  5241  41804  71295 
    North-15   6295  1041  7336  11348 
    Centre-15   16447  2394  18841  30207 
    South-15   13821  1806  15627  29740 
 EU-12   4468  3498  7966  24818 
 EU-27   41031  8739  49770  96113 
Out MS  5062  0  5063  14633 
Total EU  46093  8740  54833  110746 
 











Net total EU 
%  %  %  %  % 
EU-15  87,5  12,5  51,3  7,4  58,6 
North-15  85,8  14,2  55,5  9,2  64,6 
Centre-15  87,3  12,7  54,4  7,9  62,4 
South-15  88,4  11,6  46,5  6,1  52,5 
EU-12  56,1  43,9  18,0  14,1  32,1 
EU-27  82,4  17,6  42,7  9,1  51,8 
Out MS  100,0  0,0  34,6  0,0  34,6 
Total EU  84,1  15,9  41,6  7,9  49,5 
Source: Financial Reports Year 2009 
 
There are several reasons to explain the difference between ex ante programmed expenditure and ex-
post actually disbursed payments in the structural policies (cohesion and Pillar 2 of the CAP). Some of them 
are  set out in the  Financial  Report of the  Commission  for the  EAFRD  expenditure in  2009  (European 
Commission 2010): " “the economic crisis which had an effect on the Member States ability to provide the 
national co-financing but also might have caused beneficiaries to hesitate to enter into any commitments, the 
late approval of certain programmes as well as a lack of sufficient previous experience of some Member 
States in the implementation of Rural Development programmes”. However, there are still other reasons 
behind the gap between appropriations for commitments and actual payments. One of these is the withdrawal 
of recipients with the consequent cancellation of the commitment. This can occur for many reasons: refusal 
of banks to allow credit, changes in the farm business plan, the discovery of better funding opportunities in 
competing policies, death of the beneficiary or other changes in family decisions for health or other reasons, 
etc. It should not be forgotten even that the Commission's ex post controls may lead to the discovery of 
irregularities which would justify the refusal of payment or reimbursement to the MS and the cancellation of 
the commitment. 
Finally, we must also consider the inflationary effect which differentiates the real value of the public 
expenditure  when  time  passes  between  the  appropriations  for  commitments  allocation  and  the  actual 
disbursement of payments. This is a phenomenon that does not affect the transfer payments such as those of the first pillar because the appropriations for commitments are in this case immediately followed by the 
disbursement of money. It is interesting to understand how much the spread between appropriations for 
commitments and actual payments is affected by conjunctural and short term reasons or by structural ones. 
An in-depth analysis on a multi-year basis shows that what has been revealed for 2009 is not an exception. 
As one can verify in figure 4, the weight of the CAP on the EU Financial Reports in terms of payments have 
slightly decreased since the beginning of the decade 2000 from about 55 percent to about 50 percent. The 
CAP has been placed at this level since the Fischler Reform was introduced. With regard to the ratio between 
Pillar 1 and 2, one could argue that the low incidence of Pillar 2 in 2009 could be attributed to conjunctural 
reasons, namely the delay in the take off of the new rural development programs. This appears to be partially 
confirmed, in fact, in the period 2007-2009, as well as that of 2000-2002 at the beginning of the Agenda 
2000 programming period, there has been a slight slowing down of payments for Pillar 2. The decline is 
likely to be followed by a correspondent recovery in the final years of the current financial perspective, as it 
has  happened  in  the  period  2000-2006.  Besides  that,  however,  the  frequently  stated  objective  of  a  re-
balancing  of  the  CAP  funding  between  the  two  pillars  through  modulation  has  not  been  significantly 
observed on the basis of the Financial Reports. 
 




Source: Financial Reports Years 2007, 2008, 2009 
 
In table 3 one can observe another interesting phenomenon. The weight of the CAP on the total EU 
payments (net of administrative expenses) is distributed very unevenly among the various regions of the 
European Union. A first huge difference divides the old from the new Member States: the CAP in 2009 
weighs as much as 58.6 percent of total payments in the former, but only 32.1 percent in the latter. Besides, 
within the EU-15, significant differences appear between the 64.6 per cent of North-15 (United Kingdom, 
Ireland,  Denmark,  Sweden,  Finland),  62.4  percent  of  the  Centre-15  (France,  Germany  ,  Belgium,  The 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria) and 52.5 percent of the South-15 (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece). 
As one can observe in figure 5, the weight of the CAP on net payments for aggregates of EU Member 
States has a consolidated feature. The gap between old and new Member States, however, appears to grow 
rather  than  diminish,  while,  in  recent  years,  the  progressive  consolidation  of  the  Single  Area  Payment 
Scheme would rather have been justified, as well as the foreseeable initial difficulties with the new cohesion 
(and rural development) policy. So even within the EU-15 the figure shows a polarization, where North-15 and Centre-15 retain the positions (in both cases, the CAP is between 60 and 65 per cent of all payments), 








Source: Financial Reports Years 2007. 2008. 2009 
 
The CAP expenditure distribution between Member States is particularly relevant to understand how 
different the interest and commitment of each of them is with respect to the CAP compared to all other EU 
policies and how, during the negotiations, counterweights can be retrieved to reach an agreement. The issue 
is even more evident looking at figure 6 where it is clear that, for some individual Member States, the CAP is 
of crucial interest (at least from the standpoint of the financial benefits obtained) fundamental in motivating 
their membership and commitment to the EU. This is particularly evident in the case of Ireland, to which the 
CAP represents 81.9 percent of all payments received from the EU in the three years from 2007 to 2009. But 
also for Denmark, France and Austria the CAP is by far the largest heading of EU payments received, 
respectively 77.8, 73.7 and 71.1 percent. The situation in the new Member States in general completely 
different is, and especially in certain Mediterranean countries (like Portugal and Greece), as well as in 
Belgium and Luxembourg for which the CAP weighs only 30 per cent, or even less in some cases, of the 
total EU payments of which they are beneficiaries. Figure 6 - The CAP weight on the Net Total EU expenditure (- Admin) per Member State 
Weighted average percentage - years 2007-2008-2009 
 
 
Source: Financial Reports Years 2007, 2008, 2009  
 
As a result of the transition from the MFF appropriations, to the budget appropriations, to the ex post 
reported financial payments, even the same ratio between Pillar 1 and 2, as we have already noted, has  
substantially changed. From an ambitious 74.9 : 25.1 percent in appropriations for commitments for 2009, 
the ratio changed to 84.1 : 15.9 percent, as shown in Table 3b, as the Financial Report stated. 
There are also substantial differences in the distribution of funds at single Member State level between 
the two pillars. In particular, the weight of the rural development policy differs between the old and the new 
Member States. In the EU-12 the ratio between pillar 1 and 2 is 56.1: 43.9 percent, while it is 87.2 to only 
12.5 per cent in the EU-15. There are still serious differences also between Member States within the two 
areas. In particular, as one can observe in figure 7, while the weight of rural development policy is minimal 
(below 5%) in The Netherlands and Denmark and below 10% in France and the United Kingdom, it grows to 
a level close to or above 40% in Finland, Austria and Portugal. 
 Figure 7 - The distribution of CAP payments between pillars per Member State 
average percentage - years 2007-2008-2009 
 
 
Source: Financial Reports Years 2007, 2008, 2009  
 
The  present  study  should  be  completed  with  further  analysis  by  aggregates  of  Countries  and  by 
individual  Member  States  in  relation  to  the  main  variables  used  in  measuring  the  size  of  agriculture: 
employment (AWU), agricultural land (UAA) and economic weight (Agricultural Value Added). Table 4 
provides an initial comparative quantification. Already at this level of aggregation it is evident that with both 
agricultural  area  and,  more  importantly,  employment  how  much  the  new  EU-12  Member  States  are 
consistently penalized. The CAP payments per AWU in North-15 is 12 times higher (10 times in the Centre-
15) than in EU-12. But even within the EU-15 there are significant differences in terms of expenditure per 
AWU between North-15 and Centre-15 on one side and the Mediterranean countries on the other. Per AWU 
the first ones take about twice as much as the latter. If we consider the agricultural area as an indicator of the 
weight of agriculture of course the differences are reduced significantly, even though there is still a ratio of 
almost 3:1 per hectare between EU-15 and EU-12. 
Within the EU-15 the advantage is reversed in relation to soil quality and climatic limitations that 
prevent the North-15 Member States with labor intensive systems of production compared to the Centre-15 
MSs and especially to those of South-15. Compared to the last one, the first receives slightly lower payments 
per hectare. This condition would enable them to take advantage (of course together with the CEECs) of a 
distribution of the CAP in relation to the surface (especially if a generalized flat Single Farm Payment would 
be applied to the whole of the EU). A more balanced outcome between groups of Countries and single MSs 
would be obtained if distribution of CAP expenditure were related to the agricultural value added, compared 
to the other denominators. The difference between the EU-15 and EU-12 is minimal (8 percent points), while 
in the EU-15 there remains an imbalance in favor of the North-15 to the detriment of the South-15. 
 Table 4 - Cap expenditure per unit of labor (AWU), land (UAA),  
and agricultural Value added  
 
CAP / AWU  CAP / UAA  CAP Ag Val add 
euro 
index 
EU=100  euro 
index 
EU=100  euro 
index 
EU=100 
 EU-15   7630,4  182,5  348,4  121,8  35,2  101,2 
    North-15   12232,4  292,6  299,5  104,7  58,7  168,7 
    Centre-15   10208,5  244,2  368,4  128,8  35,9  103,1 
    South-15   5140,1  123,0  354,7  124,0  28,8  82,9 
 EU-12   1063,8  25,4  132,4  46,3  32,4  93,0 
 EU-27   4180,4  100,0  286,0  100,0  34,8  100,0 
 Source: Financial Reports Years 2007, 2008, 2009    
 
What has so far been shown by large aggregates can be seen even more clearly in the following figures 
at individual Member State level. In figure 8 the distribution of CAP payments per AWU is presented. The 
gap is huge: (a) the payment per worker in Denmark (17 519 € / AWU) is well over 57 times that in Romania 
(309 € / AWU), (b ) the discrimination between old and new Member States is evident: the last 9 on the list 
are  all  CEECs,  while  all  the  12  new  Member  States  are  among  the  last  14  of  the  list,  (c)  the  gap  is 
particularly evident even within the EU-15 since in Portugal (2974 € / AWU), the EU spends almost six 
times less than in Denmark, (d) the North-15 has a clear advantage (Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom 
are the top three), followed by the Centre-15 (Germany and France are in 5th and 6th positions). 
 
Figure 8 - Cap payments per AWU - Index EU=100 
Average payments, years 2007-2008-2009 
 
 
Source: Financial Reports Years 2007, 2008, 2009 
 
Figure 9 presents the CAP expenditure per hectare of UAA. The distribution is more even. Apart from 
the cases of Greece and Malta (respectively 822 and 789 € / ha), and immediately after The Netherlands and 
Belgium, most of the EU-15 is included in a range between 300 and 400 € / ha. A long list of EU-12 closes 
the series with payments per hectare in the range of under 200 € and, at the bottom, lie Romania and 
Bulgaria with around 50 € / ha. 
 
Figure 9 - Cap payments per UAA - Index EU=100 Average payments, years 2007-2008-2009 
 
   
Source: Financial Reports Years 2007, 2008, 2009 
 
Figure 10 shows the percentage weight of CAP payments on the agricultural gross value added of 
individual MSs. As expected, in this case the sequence between Member States with the highest percentage 
(Ireland: 91.2%) to the lowest (Romania: 10.8%) is less regular in the sense that Member States belonging to 
the same geographical area may take quite different positions. This is the case, for example, of Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic (over 70%) compared with Bulgaria, Romania and Malta (between 10 and 20%). So 
even in Mediterranean countries, while in Portugal the CAP payments cover over 50% of the Agricultural 
value added, in Italy the same ratio lies just above 20%. 
 
Figure 10 - Cap payments per Agricultural Value added 
Payments/AVA % - Average years 2007-2008-2009  
 
Source: Financial Reports Years 2007, 2008, 2009 
 The  comparison  between  the  results  presented  in  table  4  and  in  figures  8,  9,  10,  relating  to  the 
expenditure per agricultural worker, agricultural area and economic importance of agriculture leads to a 
twofold  conclusion  which  is  adequately  supported  by  the  evidence  of  data: 
(a) First, there is a significant imbalance in the distribution of CAP payments among the Member States 
especially to the detriment of the CEECs. This is clear evidence of incomplete integration still. A gap does 
exist even between the EU-15 at the expense of Mediterranean agriculture. This could be attributed to two 
factors: - the imbalance in the past between (strong) market policies and (weak) structural policies as well as 
today between the ever strong Pillar 1 and the ever weak Pillar 2; - the historical disadvantage in terms of 
price support, which has been incorporated in the Single Farm Payment, between Mediterranean products 
(wine,  fruit  and  vegetables,  etc.)  and  continental  (cereals,  industrial  crops,  meat  and  milk). 
(b) The expenditure of the CAP, overall, tends primarily to correlate positively with the capacity of a MS to 
produce agricultural value added: one could also synthesize that the richer the agriculture, the higher the 
CAP support. Besides that, the CAP payments flow mostly to the benefit of the MSs with more extensive 
farming systems (those with a high ratio UAA / AWU). 
4.  SOME FURTHER LINES OF RESEARCH 
The analysis carried out, as in our case, at aggregate Member State level, only partially reveals the gap 
between intentional and actual CAP expenditure. More than one aspect encourages the use of an evidence-
based approach down within individual Member States. A very promising line of research has been recently 
initiated on CAP spending in Italy, based on 2009 payments reported by the national CAP paying authority.  
Table 5 shows the distribution of CAP expenditure in Italy per class total amount received by the 
recipient. The level of concentration is very high: 35 100 recipients, 2.7 per cent, receive more than half 
(50.9 percent, 78,929 euro each) of all CAP spending, while, on the opposite side, one million 117 thousand 
beneficiaries, 85.1 percent receive only 20 per cent (i.e. 81 euro per month, 6 percent of an average salary). 
One  can  argue  that  both  the  cases  are  contradictory  and  there  are  good  reasons  for  a  radical  change: 
probably, for the few richest farms, the CAP payments represents just an additional rent, while for the 
plethora of small farms, that in Italy have generally a subsidiary role in the family interests and income, it 
has a very minimal incidence.  
 




CAP expenditure  CAP beneficiaries  Average 
payment 
Absolute value in 
M€  %  Absolute value in 
000  %  Euro per 
beneficiary 
 Less than 1.000  301.8  5.5  765.1  58.3  394 
>1 000. <=5 000  791.4  14.5  352.2  26.8  2247 
>5 000. <=10 000  622.9  11.4  91.9  7.0  6780 
>10 000. <=25 000  971.7  17.8  67.2  5.1  14456 
>25 000. <=50 000  674.1  12.3  21.2  1.6  31861 
>50 000. <=100 000  573.6  10.5  9.2  0.7  62350 
More than 100 000  1538.5  28.1  4.9  0.4  314101 
Total  5473.9  100.0  1311.6  100.0  4173 
Source: Our elaboration on AGEA data 17 
 
In figure 11 the total expenditure in Italy is presented per quintiles at NUTS3 level sorted by total 
payments per UAA (a) and total payments per AWU (b). The subsequent degrees of gray from the darkest to 
the brightest show in which NUTS3 the payments are concentrated, regardless of the variable used as a 
denominator. There is a clear concentration of CAP expenditure in the areas of the Po Valley, the so-called 
“pulp” of Italian agriculture: the richest, the most advanced in structural terms, with the largest farm size and 
the  most  updated  technology.  The  NUTS3  of  the  rest  of  the  Country,  the  so  called  “bone”  of  Italian 
agriculture, are unlikely to belong to the first quintiles. Only some NUTS3 with intensive agriculture and 
intensive olive plantations of Calabria and Apulia shade darker, when NUTS3 have been sorted on the basis 
of payments per hectare of UAA. Only a few NUTS3 of central Italy with labor saving agriculture and the 
oldest farmers of Italy were in the first quintiles when NUTS3 had been sorted by payments per AWU.  
On the other hand, the whole arch of the Alpine NUTS3 as well as the Apennines NUTS3 located on 
the spine splitting the peninsula in two from North to South, which for climatic and physical constraints 
deserve the highest support, are generally in the last (white) quintile.  
 
Figure 11 - Concentration of CAP payments in Italy in quintiles 
 
a) sorted by CAP payments / UAA  b) sorted by CAP payments / AWU 
   
Source: Our elaboration on AGEA data Ancona - 122
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Such strong concentration of the CAP expenditure in terms both of recipients, and more 
than  that,  of  localization  significantly  reduces  any  alleged  link  between  the  present  CAP 
expenditure and the provision of public goods through agriculture. 
5.  CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
The research conducted here should continue with more data and analysis. Even at the 
present stage, as a first conclusion it could be suggested that an evidence-based approach is 
particularly recommended in CAP expenditure analysis. Moving from the programs, as reflected 
in  the  MFF  and  budget,  to  the  actual  policy,  registered  ex-post  in  terms  of  payment  and 
financial flows, the quantitative levels of spending change. The relative proportion between the 
CAP and the other EU policies changes as well. The same happens within the CAP between its 
components and, above all, between Pillars 1 and 2.  
Looking at a multiannual span of time we have verified that these changes are prevalently 
due  to  systematic  distortions,  rather  than  to  conjunctural  fluctuations.  If  these  systematic 
distortions are not taken into account, the image of the CAP expenditure discussed in political 
debate (which is one of the crucial issues of the reform process) is significantly distorted as well 
compared to the reality.  
Recognizing this gap between the image and the reality of the CAP expenditure not only 
brings the discussion on the CAP and its reform process to a more objective ground, but also 
suggests making  more of an effort to rationalize the implementation and the administrative 
procedures and attributing more importance to evaluation and monitoring.. 
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